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assets trade. The first, Dem, pays $1 if
the Democratic Party receives the most
popular votes, and $0 otherwise. The
other, Rep, pays $1 if the Republican
Party receives the most popular votes,
and nothing otherwise.
Wendy thinks that the probability the
Democrats will win the most votes in the
2004 presidential election is 55 percent.
For Wendy, the expected value of hold-
ing the Dem contract to maturity is
$0.55—the probability that she attaches
to a Democrat winning the most votes
(55 percent) times the payoff ($1.00). If
some other trader were offering the Dem
contract at a price below $0.55, Wendy
should be willing to buy the contract. By
way of example, suppose that another
trader were offering the Dem contract at
a price of $0.40. Wendy should buy the
contract at this price since she would
earn an expected profit of $0.15: The
expected value of the contract ($0.55)
less the price paid ($0.40). 
By the same token, Wendy should be
willing to sell the Dem contract (if she
holds it in her portfolio) at a price above
$0.55. If another trader was willing to
pay, say, $0.66 for this contract, then
Wendy earns an expected profit of 
April 15, 2003




In 1998, University of Iowa faculty
members created their own futures
markets. These experimental mar-
kets, designed to provide insights into
the behavior of traders and naturally
occurring markets, are still going
strong. Their clever design gives them
another practical use: They can be
used to predict future events such as
election outcomes and Federal Open
Market Committee voting.
W hen making comparisons with the
so-called hard sciences, economics is
often likened to astronomy. Both fields
begin with a set of observations, and 
theories are evaluated on how well they
fit these observations. Of course, theory
often guides what is observed, and
improved measurement can overturn
previously accepted wisdom. By way of
contrast, physics is characterized by
experiments that can, in principle, be
replicated by anyone. 
Co-winner of the 2002 Nobel Prize in
economics, Vernon Smith, was recog-
nized for his pioneering contributions to
experimental economics, a field that
resembles physics more than astronomy.
Today, experimental economics is often
conducted in laboratories, where
researchers control various aspects of
the economic environment in which the
subjects (typically university students)
interact. Many experiments are con-
ducted electronically over networked
computers. In fact, there is nothing that
requires that the subjects be on the same
campus—or even the same continent. 
The Iowa Electronic Markets (IEM) are
a set of experimental markets that allow
for very wide participation. They were
created in 1988 by University of Iowa
faculty as a tool for studying the behav-
ior of individual traders and markets as a
whole. The IEM are futures markets—
markets that trade assets whose ultimate
value depends on the outcome of some
future event. A variety of markets are
operated. Some are based on upcoming
political events such as elections, some
on the future decisions of  policymakers,
and some even on the box-office receipts
of soon-to-be-released movies. Stakes
are fairly modest: An account can be
opened for as little as $5 and no more
than $500.
The IEM’s usefulness extends beyond the
purely academic interests of economists.
Political markets are very popular at the
IEM, and the prices in these markets are
typically good indicators of eventual
election results. In fact, the prices from
the IEM are often better at predicting
election outcomes than public opinion
polls. The university claims that the IEM
predict election outcomes with a predic-
tion error of only 1.37 percentage points.
This Commentary explains how the IEM
are designed to predict public opinion
and looks at two of the Iowa Electronic
Markets. The first is a political market in
which participants speculated on which
party would gain control of the U.S.
Senate and House following the Novem-
ber 2002 elections. The second market
lets traders predict upcoming decisions
of the Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC).
■ Designed to Tap Public
Opinion 
One of the clever—and perhaps
unique—features of the IEM is the 
discrete nature of the payoffs. Contracts
are written to pay $1 at maturity if some
event occurs (for example, if the Demo-
cratic Party candidate receives the most
popular votes). Tying a $1 payoff to the
occurrence of a future event means that
contract prices reflect the probabilities
that the marginal trader attaches to each
of two events. One is the event happen-
ing; the other is it not happening. 
Of course, prices and probabilities
might change as the contracts are traded
over time.
To see why the prices correspond to
probabilities, consider a trader, Wendy,
who decides to participate in the 2004
U.S. Presidential “Winner-Takes-All”
Market. Suppose that in this market, two$0.11 by selling it to this trader: the
$0.66 that she receives for the contract,
less the $0.55 expected value that she
associates with this contract. 
What if Wendy doesn’t have any of the
Dem contract in her portfolio? On Wall
Street, Wendy would sell the Dem con-
tract short—in essence, sell a contract
that she doesn’t currently own. While
the IEM do not allow for short sales (to
ensure that the IEM neither make nor
lose money owing to a trader defaulting
on a short sale), they do allow traders to
buy for $1 a “contract bundle” consist-
ing of one unit of each contract. In this
case, traders can purchase a bundle con-
sisting of one unit of Dem and one unit
of Rep. Notice that if a trader buys this
bundle and holds it to maturity, she sim-
ply gets her dollar back since one of
these events will occur. 
So, if some other trader is offering to
buy the Dem contract at a price above
Wendy’s expected value of $0.55, all
she needs to do is to buy a contract bun-
dle and sell off the Dem contract. To fig-
ure out Wendy’s expected profit on such
a transaction, notice that if Wendy
places a probability of 55 percent on
Dem, she must place a probability of 45
percent on Rep (assuming that no other
party stands a chance of winning a plu-
rality of the popular vote). Conse-
quently, the expected value of holding
one Rep contract is $0.45 (again, the
probability of a Republican winning the
popular vote, 45 percent, times the pay-
off, $1.00). So if Wendy can sell the
Dem contract for $0.66, she earns an
expected profit of $0.11: the $0.66 from
the sale of Dem plus the $0.45 expected
value of Rep, less the $1.00 that she
paid for the contract bundle. 
What will happen for the market as a
whole? In particular, suppose that
Randy thinks the likelihood that the
Democrats will win the popular vote is
60 percent while Wendy’s probability is
55 percent. Presumably, Wendy will sell
Dem contracts to Randy, buying up con-
tract bundles if necessary. In this case,
two outcomes are likely. The first is that
either Wendy or Randy will run out of
funds: Recall that the maximum invest-
ment the IEM will accept is $500. We
would expect the price of Dem to 
be somewhere between $0.55 and
$0.60, with both Randy and Wendy
earning what they perceive to be
expected profits from these transactions. 
A second possibility is that Wendy,
Randy, or both will revise the probabili-
ties they attach to the Democrats win-
ning the most votes. Why might this hap-
pen? Wendy might think other traders
have information she does not have—
after all, she has to figure these other
traders are not taking expected losses
when they trade with her. So, Wendy can
be expected to revise up the probability
she associates with the Democrats win-
ning the popular vote. Likewise, traders
like Randy can be expected to revise
down the probability they attach to the
Democrats winning the most votes. As
these probabilities converge, so will the
prices at which traders are willing to buy
and sell the Dem contract. In the end, the
price will end up somewhere between
$0.55 and $0.60. 
The key insight is that the price paid 
for Dem will end up reflecting the proba-
bility the marginal investor places on the
Democrats winning the popular vote in
the 2004 U.S. presidential election. Sim-
ilarly, the price of Rep will reflect the
probability traders attach to the Republi-
cans winning the popular vote. 
■ The 2002 U.S. Congressional
Control Market 
The 2002 Congressional Control 
Market opened on July 19, 2002, and
closed on November 7, 2002 (two days
after election day). Four contracts
traded in this market, with the payoffs
depending on whether Republicans
gained control of the House, the Senate,
both, or neither. For example, the con-
tract RH NS (Republican House/Non-
Republican Senate) promised to pay 
$1 if, following the 2002 elections, the
Republicans controlled the House but
not the Senate. The payoffs for the other
contracts (NH RS, RH RS, and NH NS)
were similarly defined.
As above, the prices of these assets
reflect the probabilities that market par-
ticipants placed on the various events to
which the contracts correspond. Further-
more, we can compute the probability
participants placed on events that aren’t
directly represented by the contracts. For
example, we can find the probability
placed on Republican control of the
House, independent of whether they also
controlled the Senate. In this case, we
would add the price of the contracts 
RH RS and RH NS. Similarly, the proba-
bility of a Republican Senate indepen-
dent of the outcome for the House is
obtained as the sum of the prices of the
contracts RH RS and NH RS. 
Figure 1 gives the prices (or probabili-
ties) of either a Republican-controlled
House or a Republican-controlled Sen-
ate for the period over which this market
operated. Until September, Republican
control of the House was seen as a
50–50 proposition, while their control of
the Senate received a probability of
around 20 percent. In October, the likeli-
hood of a Republican-controlled House
fluctuated between 65 percent and 90
percent while the likelihood of a Repub-
lican Senate fluctuated around 40 per-
cent. It was not until election day results
came in that market participants locked
in on the eventual outcome: Republican
control of both the House and Senate.
Of course, this outcome was generally a
surprise: Neither pollsters nor political
commentators called the Republican
win in the Senate. 
■ The Federal Reserve
Monetary Policy Market B 
The Federal Reserve Monetary Policy
Market B has operated since October 3,
2001 (the day following an FOMC meet-
ing). Prices in this market give the proba-
bilities that the market’s participants
place on what the FOMC will do to the
federal funds rate at its next meeting.
For most meetings, three contracts have
traded. For example, before the Novem-
ber 2002 FOMC meeting, the contracts
were: FRup1102, FRsame1102, and
FRdown1102, which corresponded to
whether the FOMC raised the federal
funds rate target at the November meet-
ing, kept it the same, or lowered it. 
Figure 2 plots the last price for each day
of trading since the Federal Reserve
Monetary Policy Market B opened. 
The prices do not necessarily sum to 
one in the figure, whereas the underly-
ing probabilities must, but this is just an
unfortunate consequence of using the
last price of the day. Preceding the
November 2001 FOMC meeting, the
market prices tell us that market partici-
pants initially placed fairly equal proba-
bility of the FOMC either leaving the
target unchanged or lowering it. How-
ever, as the month progressed, partici-
pants ended up placing a high likelihood
on a reduction. In fact, the FOMC low-
ered its target 50 basis points. Before trading began for the December
2001 FOMC meeting, the directors of
the IEM introduced two “spin-off” 
contracts, which split the FRdown1201
contract. Specifically, they introduced
FR25dn1201, which paid $1.00 if the
fed funds rate target was decreased at
the December 2001 meeting by fewer
than 50 basis points, and FR50dn1201,
which paid $1.00 if the target was
reduced 50 basis points or more.
The directors reserve the right to intro-
duce such “spin-off” contracts at any
time in the Federal Reserve Monetary
Policy Market B. Had there been trading
in FRdown1201 prior to the spin off, 
a trader holding an FRdown1201 con-
tract would receive one FR25dn1201
contract and one FR50dn1201 contract.
Thus, the liquidation value of the 
spun-off contracts is the same as the 
liquidation value of the original contract.
As can be seen in figure 2, market partic-
ipants never placed much likelihood on a
50 basis point cut and ended up placing
considerable probability on a 25 basis
point cut (the outcome announced by
the FOMC). 
From December 2001 to November
2002, the FOMC left the target fed
funds rate unchanged. With a few
notable exceptions, participants in the
IEM have placed very high probability
on no change. The first exception
occurred leading up to the January
2002 FOMC meeting. Participants
placed a sizeable likelihood on a further
cut, with this probability peaking at
around 74 percent in the middle of Jan-
uary. Subsequently, the bulk of the
probability was placed on no change.
The second exception occurred in early
trading on the May 2002 contract,
when participants placed considerable
likelihood on an increase in the target.
Finally, just prior to the August 2002
FOMC meeting, the market placed a
small but nonnegligible weight on a
cut. A small probability of a cut is also
evident in trading for the September
2002 FOMC meeting. Following this
meeting, market participants placed
roughly even odds on either a cut or no
change in the fed funds rate target. The
market was no doubt sorting out the sig-
nificance of the dissents by Federal
Reserve Board Governor Gramlich and
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Presi-
dent McTeer, both of whom preferred a
reduction in the fed funds rate target. 
By mid-October, IEM participants evi-
dently placed a low probability (10–20
percent) on a cut. But on October 29—
more than a week before the FOMC
meeting—the probability of a cut broke
above 50 percent, and in the days just
prior to the FOMC meeting, the market
placed the chance of a cut at 90 percent.
On November 6, the FOMC did in fact
cut by 50 basis points. The cut—if not
the size—was widely anticipated in the
financial press. 
■ Better than Gallup? 
The IEM political markets have a cou-
ple of advantages over their closest
“competitor,” the public opinion poll.
One advantage is that data from the
IEM are available virtually instanta-
neously and almost continuously.
Results from polls are typically several
days old when they are reported and are
taken at discrete intervals. Conse-
quently, data from the IEM are more
amenable to studying events like the
untimely death of a Senate candidate. 
A further advantage of the IEM is that
contracts can be written based on
intrinsically interesting events, such as















FIGURE 2 FEDERAL RESERVE MONETARY POLICY MARKET B 
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who controls the House or Senate. Poll
results require more massaging to
answer such questions. 
In trying to predict FOMC interest rate
changes, Wall Street commentators often
infer probabilities from fed funds rate
futures. The payoffs from fed funds rate
futures are constructed in such a way,
though, that they can only tell us about
the expected value of the fed funds rate in
some future month and not the underly-
ing probabilities. To tease out probabili-
ties from fed funds rate futures, commen-
tators need to make reasonable
assumptions regarding the likely size of
the change in the fed funds rate target. At
the very least, the IEM provides useful
supplemental information regarding
these probabilities.